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Introduction
Share repurchases have become a common phenomenon worldwide in recent years.
According to Vermaelen (2005) the global increase in repurchase activity seems to be a result of deregulation, tax changes, shareholder value maximization as a growing corporate objective, and the growth of employee stock ownership plans. Share repurchases have also become an important form of payout method of cash to shareholders since they are viewed by managers as more flexible than dividends. Survey results of Brav et al. (2005) report that managers use this flexibility to alter payout in response to the availability of good investment opportunities and accelerate or initiate share repurchases when their stock is perceived as undervalued.
1 Studies of open market share repurchase programs in Hong-Kong (Brockman and Chung, 2001) , Japan (Zhang, 2002) , the US (Cook et al., 2004) , and Canada (McNally et al., 2006 ) also find empirical support that firms exhibit market timing skills with their repurchase trades.
Even though share repurchases have been allowed in the US for decades it was not until recently that share repurchases were allowed in many European countries due to concerns about creditor protection, price manipulation, unequal treatment of shareholders, and insider trading by the firms. The regulatory framework that has been adopted to deal with these issues differs across countries which sometimes makes it difficult to interpret research results from one market to another. Sweden was the last country in the European Union (EU) to allow share repurchases when they removed restrictions on share repurchases in March 2000. 2 A major difference between the regulatory framework in Sweden and many other countries, including the US, is that Swedish firms are required to disclose their repurchase transactions on a daily basis. 3 This implies that the market is informed of any repurchase trading within 24
hours. Given that the market believes that firms exhibit timing abilities due to asymmetric information, one would expect that share repurchase trading is perceived by the market participants as a signal of undervaluation. When the market detects or learns about the repurchasing activity one would expect a positive and permanent price impact. Alternatively, a positive price impact can also be related to a liquidity effect where the price impact would likely be temporary.
3
There is a rich literature studying the price impact surrounding announcements of open market share repurchase programs in the US. 4 In the US, share repurchase programs are authorized by the board of directors and hence do not need shareholder approval as in European countries. Announcements of open market share repurchase programs in the US seem to be associated with a positive abnormal return of around 3%. The most prevalent explanation for this finding is that managers activate open market share repurchase programs when the stock is perceived as undervalued. The announcement is therefore a signal of undervaluation of the firm's stock which exhibits a positive abnormal return. Prior studies that have examined the announcement effect of open market share repurchase programs in Europe have found a much smaller price impact than that found in the US. 5 However, these studies differ from the US studies since they examine the announcement effect surrounding announcements that the firms intend to ask for the shareholders' approval to start a repurchase program at the next shareholders' meeting. The smaller price impact is thus not surprising since all firms should request an authorization by the shareholders to be able to take advantage of buying undervalued shares whether or not the shares are undervalued at the time of the announcement (see Ikenberry et al., 1996) . The price impact found in the European studies is therefore more a price effect of the option to be able to repurchase shares. 6 A more similar announcement to the US authorization announcements is the announcement that the board of directors intends to activate a share repurchase program after the shareholders have authorized the board of directors to activate a share repurchase program. According to disclosure rules on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, the board of directors must announce when they have decided to initiate a share repurchase program. In contrast to the authorization announcements in the US and the intention announcements in Europe, the initiation announcements by the Swedish firms are always followed by actual repurchases.
Consequently, the price impact of these initiation announcements is interesting to study and also compare with the announcement effects from US authorization announcements and "intention" announcements studied in prior European studies since the initiation announcement is a stronger signal that the firm will actually repurchase shares. Stockholm Stock Exchange. 7 The purpose of the study is to examine the share price behavior surrounding initiation announcements of open market share repurchase programs, the price impact of repurchase trading, and the long-run abnormal stock performance following the announcements.
Investigating the price impact of open market share repurchases in Sweden is interesting for several reasons. First, Swedish disclosure rules enable market participants to be informed of any repurchase trading on a daily basis which could have an impact on the stock price if the investors perceive the information valuable. Second, the repurchase volume on the repurchase days is quite substantial. On average the repurchase volume represents 31% (median = 22%) of the total traded volume in the repurchasing firm's stock on the repurchase days. This large demand-driven volume could lead to a price support on the repurchase days. Third, it is useful to investigate if there is evidence of a positive long-run abnormal stock performance subsequent to repurchase announcements in Sweden as documented in other countries (see e.g., Ikenberry et al., 1995 Ikenberry et al., , 2000 Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Zhang, 2002 Zhang, , 2005 Chan et al., 2004; McNally and Smith, 2007; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009; and Yook, 2010) .
I find a significant negative abnormal return over the 20 trading days preceding the initiation announcement of the open market share repurchase program, and a statistically significant two-day abnormal return of 1.94% at the announcement. When I examine the announcement effect stratified by the stated reason for the repurchase program, I find a smaller two-day abnormal return (AR=0.86%) for repurchase programs motivated by an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) compared to repurchase programs with other motives. The average abnormal return is significant and positive on the three first repurchase days in a repurchase program, with an abnormal return of approximately 0.7% on the first repurchase day. Since the market reaction is permanent the result indicates that the market perceives the actual repurchases as a signal of undervaluation. 8 On average, repurchase days have a small, but statistically significant abnormal return of 0.12% with an equally-weighted stock return index as benchmark. The price impact on the repurchase days is positively correlated with the repurchase volume which suggests that price impact is also the result of a liquidity effect.
Using Ibbotson's (1975) RATS methodology and the calendar-time portfolio approach with the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, I
find a statistically and economically significant long-run abnormal return of 6-7% over the 12 7 Open market share repurchases were first allowed in Sweden 10 March 2000. 8 The submission of buy limit orders by repurchasing firms may otherwise result in a temporary price impact.
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months following the month of the initiation announcement. In the second year, I document no evidence of positive abnormal return, a finding which is inconsistent with Ikenberry et al. (1995 Ikenberry et al. ( , 2000 , and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009 Concluding remarks are provided in section 7.
Previous research
There is a rich literature about the price impact of authorization announcements of open market share repurchase programs. Dann (1981) , Vermaelen (1981) , Comment and Jarell (1991) , Stephens and Weisbach (1998) , Ikenberry et al. (1995) , Grullon and Michaely (2004) , and Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) all find a significant abnormal price increase surrounding repurchase authorization announcements in the US of around 3%, indicating that repurchase announcements have a positive economic benefit for shareholders.
9
Lasfer (2002) and Rau and Vermaelen (2002) examine the share price behavior surrounding announcements of intentions to repurchase shares by UK and other European firms. The intention announcement is an announcement that the board of directors has approved a repurchase program and will be seeking authorization of the program at the next shareholder meeting. In their studies they find small but statistically significant announcement returns of around 1%. Hong-Kong and Canada respectively. They all find a positive price impact on the repurchase days and support for the hypothesis that actual share repurchases are signal of undervaluation that the market can detect. Ikenberry et al. (1995) argue that if managers can detect undervaluation of the firm's shares and therefore decide to buy back shares, the announcement of the repurchase program is a valuable signal to the less informed marketplace. If the capital market is semi-efficient, the new equilibrium price should immediately fully reflect the "true" value of the new information. However, studies such as Ikenberry et al. (1995 Ikenberry et al. ( , 2000 , Chan et al. (2004) , Zhang (2005) , and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) find long-run abnormal returns up to 48 months following repurchase announcements. Thus, the market seems to underreact to the information conveyed in repurchase announcements. Why the market reaction extends for such a long time is still puzzling. One explanation for the reported long-run excess returns is that they could be caused by chance and may be sample specific as argued by Kothari and Warner (1997), and Fama (1998 the maximum number of shares to be acquired, and the duration of the program must be adequately disclosed to the public. The repurchasing company must publicly disclose details of all transactions no later than the end of the seventh daily market session following the date of the repurchase transactions. In so far as repurchase prices are concerned, the company may not purchase shares at a price higher than the higher of the price of the last independent trade and the highest current independent bid on the trading venues where the purchase is carried out. In so far as volume is concerned, the company may not purchase more than 25% of the average daily volume traded in the month preceding the month of the public disclosure of the repurchase program or when the program makes no reference to that volume, the average daily volume traded in the 20 trading days preceding the date of purchase.
16
In many countries corporate insiders such as officers, directors, and major shareholders are prohibited to trade in the firm's stock when the informational advantage is expected to be particularly high. In Sweden firms are also defined as insiders and according to Swedish law, 13 Companies may also repurchase their own stock on an authorized market or another regulated market outside the European Economic Area after approval from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FI). 14 Market Abuse Penal Act (SFS 2005:377) .
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firms may not engage in trading in their own shares during the 30 days prior to the publishing of interim reports, the day of publication included.
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Companies repurchasing their own shares on the Stockholm Stock Exchange must comply with the stock exchange's rules regarding share repurchases. 18 The rule book for issuers issued by NASDAQ OMX Stockholm states the following regarding share repurchases; the company's resolution at a general shareholder meeting to purchase the company's own shares and decisions by the board of directors to utilize possible authorizations to purchase the company's own shares must be disclosed as soon as possible. The disclosure must contain information on;
 the period during which the decision to purchase the company's own shares is to be effected or the period during which the authorization may be utilized,  existing holdings of the company's own shares and the maximum number of shares intended to be purchased,  the highest and lowest repurchase price per share,  the purpose of the repurchase program.
The company must report to the stock exchange all repurchase transactions as soon as possible and not later than 30 minutes before the stock exchange opens on the trading day immediately following the repurchase day. With the exception of block transactions, the company may not purchase more than 25% of the average daily turnover during the four calendar weeks immediately preceding the week of the repurchase. 19 The company may only place orders or close transactions in the company's own shares within the bid-ask spread applying on the stock exchange.
Trading structure on the Stockholm Stock Exchange
Trading in shares listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (NASDAQ OMX Stockholm) is conducted in a computerized order-driven trading system. Traders submit orders in the trading system through exchange members. There are no designated market makers, however some smaller firms engage liquidity providers. Buy and sell orders entered into the trading system are automatically matched. Limit orders are first prioritized by price and then by time. If a trader requires immediate execution, the trader must submit a buy (sell) limit order that hits the current best ask (bid) price. Traders can submit hidden limit orders, where only a portion of the order volume is displayed in the limit order book. However, the hidden portion has lower priority than the displayed limit orders with the same price. Exchange members can choose between trading on-exchange or outside the stock exchange (OTC). On-exchange, the Exchange member can either make trades in the computerized order-driven trading system or outside the order book as a manual trade. In both cases the trades must comply with the requirements of the Exchange. Manual trades that take place during the trading hours of the stock exchange must be reported as close to real time as possible, but no later than three minutes from the trading agreement. Manual trades that take place after trading hours must be reported prior to the opening of the stock exchange the following trading day.
The Stockholm Stock Exchange offers a high degree of transparency. Traders observe, in real-time, bid and ask prices with corresponding depth, concluded transactions, as well as the identities of exchange members behind executed transactions.
Data and sample
The Information on the share repurchase transactions was collected from NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. 21 The data includes the name of the repurchasing firm, the repurchase date, the total number of shares repurchased during the day distributed by class of share, and the average repurchase price. NASDAQ OMX Stockholm also provided data on daily trading volumes for on-exchange trades executed both inside and outside the computerized order-11 driven trading system (automatic and manual trades respectively). The first repurchase transaction in the sample is on March 30, 2000 and the last transaction is on April 9, 2010.
The Thomson Reuters Datastream database was used to obtain price and total return data on individual shares as well as data on book values of equity. The total number of outstanding shares was provided by Euroclear Sweden and was also hand-collected from annual reports.
22 Table 1 The fraction of the total number of shares that the shareholders authorized the company to repurchase is on average 8.8%. However, this figure is slightly flawed since approximately 83% of the repurchase authorizations are not authorizations for a maximum repurchase amount, but instead authorizations for a maximum fraction of treasury stock that the company is allowed to keep at any time. 23 With these authorizations the companies may therefore in reality repurchase a larger fraction than the authorized fraction if the repurchased shares are cancelled during the repurchase program.
The shareholders generally authorize the board of directors to initiate a share repurchase program. The decision by the board of directors to utilize such a repurchase authorization must be publicly disclosed immediately and the announcement must include the maximum number of shares intended to be purchased. The sought fraction in Table 1 is the maximum fraction of the total number of shares in the company that the board of directors intends to repurchase in the repurchase program. Since 125 initiation announcements were not found in the AffärsData database or the press release archives on the companies' websites, and one initiation announcement missed the sought fraction, the sought fraction is based on 209 initiation announcements. 24 The sought fraction in the initiated share repurchase programs decreased during the sample period 2000 through 2009. In the 209 initiation announcements, the sought fraction is on average 6.1% with a median of 7.0%.
22 Euroclear Sweden provided data on the total number of shares at the end of each year. The total number of shares within years was hand-collected from annual reports. 23 According to the Swedish Companies Act, the maximum treasury stock the company is allowed to keep at any time is limited to 10% of the total number of shares in the company (SFS 1975 :1385 and SFS 2005 . 24 In some cases the firms have failed to comply with the Exchange's rules to publicly announce the initiation of share repurchase programs.
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The bought fraction in Table 1 is the fraction of the total number of shares in the company that was actually repurchased in the repurchase program. The mean fraction of the total number of shares that were purchased in a repurchase program was 2.7%, while the median fraction repurchased was 1.8%. The maximum bought fraction in a share repurchase program was 10.9%, which was accomplished by one company (JM AB) that had a mandate from the shareholders' meeting to keep up to 10% of the total number of shares as treasury shares.
Since the firm cancelled some of the treasury shares during the program period, the firm was able to repurchase more 10% of the total number of shares in the program. dates, the median number of trading days between the repurchase authorization at a shareholders' meeting and the announcement by the board of directors to utilize such an authorization was 30, while the average number of trading days was 58. For all repurchase programs in the sample, the median number of trading days between the authorization and the first repurchase day was 38, while the average was 64 trading days. In general the first repurchase is executed only 2 trading days (median) after the initiation announcement of the repurchase program.
Methods for measuring the price impact of open market share repurchases
The main objective of this study is to measure the price impact of open market share repurchases. The price impact is examined short-term around the initiation announcement of the repurchase programs as well as around the actual share repurchases. Studying short-term price effects of different events is fairly straightforward, and most studies today use the event study methodology introduced in the seminal paper by Fama et al. (1969) . Later studies by e.g. Warner (1980, 1985) and Patell (1976) consider implementation issues in the event-study methodology.
25
In addition, the paper examines the long-run share performance after the initiation announcement of repurchase programs. Care must be taken in measuring long-run performance since bad-model errors in expected returns grow faster with the return horizon 25 Warner (1980, 1985) deal with implementation issues for data sampled at a monthly, respectively a daily interval, and Patell (1976) deals with standardized abnormal returns.
13
than the volatility of returns, and according to Fama (1998) most long-term anomalies tend to become marginal or disappear when exposed to different models for expected returns or when different statistical approaches are used to measure them.
In the next sections I describe the methods used in the paper to measure short-and long term abnormal returns.
Measuring abnormal returns surrounding initiation announcements of open market share repurchase programs
In Sweden and Europe a repurchase program must be authorized by the shareholders at a shareholders' meeting and generally the shareholders authorize the board of directors to initiate the share repurchase program. If the board of directors decides to utilize the authorization, information about the intended repurchase program must be disclosed as soon as possible. Since the authorization date is the same date as the date of the shareholders' meeting, and information about the program is already known to the market by then, there is no new information about the repurchase program at the authorization date. 26 The authorization event is therefore not appropriate to study in Europe since it is not an event unexpected by the market. Instead I study the initiation announcement by the board of directors which is a strong signal that the firm really intends to repurchase shares. 27 The initiation announcement also discloses more precise information about the purpose of the program, the repurchasing period, and the number of shares sought, than the authorization of the program.
28
To investigate the price impact surrounding the initiation announcement of the repurchase program I apply a standard event study methodology with the market model as benchmark for calculating abnormal returns. The market model is (1) where R i,t is the total return on security i over day t and R m,t is the return on the valueweighted OMXSPI over day t. α i and β i are the parameters of the market model, and ε i,t is the zero mean disturbance term. Returns are indexed in event time with the event date at τ=0. The event date is the date of the initiation announcement by the board of directors. τ=T 1 +1 to τ=T 2 represents the event window, and τ=T 0 +1 to τ=T 1 represents the estimation window. The 26 The authorization is expected at the shareholders' meeting and the notice of meeting details the resolutions. 27 All initiation announcements during the sample period have been followed by actual share repurchases. 28 In many cases the shareholders authorize the board of directors to repurchase the maximum legal limit of shares until the next annual general meeting, and for several different purposes.
length of the estimation window is 250 trading days and is defined as L 1 =T 1 -T 0 . I examine the abnormal returns 20 trading days before and 20 trading days after the announcement event, thus the length of the event window is 41 trading days and is defined as L 2 =T 2 -T 1 . Under general conditions ordinary least squares (OLS) is a consistent estimation procedure for the market model parameters. The OLS estimators of the market model are estimated for each event j over the estimation window L 1 .
29 Using the market model to measure the normal return, the abnormal return for event j at event day τ in the event window is computed as (2) where ̂ and ̂ are OLS values from the market model and estimated during the estimation period L 1 for each event j.
For each event in the sample the cumulative abnormal return is calculated from event day τ 1 to τ 2 . The cumulative average abnormal return across all the events, N, in the sample is then
The null hypothesis to be tested is that the cumulative average abnormal return during the event window is equal to zero. This makes sense since I want to examine whether the initiation announcement, on average, is associated with a change in shareholder value. I use the test statistic procedure proposed by Patell (1976) which allows the abnormal return to have a different standard deviation each day and considers any increase in variance due to prediction outside the estimation period. Under the null hypothesis, conditional on the event window market returns, the standard deviation of the abnormal return each event day τ for event j is (4) where is the standard deviation of the residual for event j over the estimation period L 1 in the market model regression (1). μ m,j is the average market return over the estimation period for event j. The abnormal return each event day is standardized by the estimated standard deviation of the abnormal return. By standardizing the abnormal returns I obtain identical 29 To reduce the potential bias from non-synchronous trading I also estimate adjusted betas using the Scholes and Williams (1977) procedure, but find no change in the results. (5) and the standardized cumulative abnormal return from τ 1 to τ 2 for event j is estimated as (6) The standardized cumulative abnormal return for each event j is distributed as a Student t statistic with L 1 -2 degrees of freedom. To test if the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) is zero I calculate the following test statistic (7) where the estimation window, L 1 , for each event j is 250 trading days. Since the estimation window is large, the distribution of the test statistic tend to the unit normal N(0, 1).
The use of event study methodology with daily returns is subject to a number of potential problems of concern. First, the evidence suggests that distributions of daily returns for an individual security are fat-tailed relative to a normal distribution. However, Brown and Warner (1985) show that the non-normality of daily returns has no obvious impact on event study methodologies since the mean excess return in a cross-section of securities converges to normality as the number of sample securities increases. 30 Second, non-synchronous trading may result in biased ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of beta. I estimate beta parameters based on the methodology procedure suggested by Scholes and Williams (1977) to control for non-synchronous trading and find similar results as with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of market model parameters. Third, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence in the time-series of mean daily excess returns may be a concern, and adjustment of the variance estimate to account for these issues may be necessary. However, Brown and Warner 30 If the returns in the cross-section of securities are independent and identically distributed the distribution of the sample mean return will increasingly approximate a normal distribution according to the Central Limit Theorem. (1985) find that only in special cases is it necessary to adjust the variance estimates to account for these issues.
In an event study it is important to identify the exact date of the event. Since, the initiation announcements of share repurchase must be publicly disclosed as soon as possible after the decision by the board of directors to utilize the authorization, the exact date of the event is easily identified. To accommodate for announcements after the stock exchange's trading hours I use a two-day event window (0 to +1), when I analyze the market reaction to initiation announcements of share repurchase programs.
Measuring abnormal returns on share repurchase days
To test whether repurchase trading causes a price impact, I measure the abnormal return on the actual repurchase days. When I explicitly study the price impact surrounding the first repurchase day in a repurchase program, I estimate the abnormal returns with the market model specification described in section 5.1 as benchmark. The market model specification is however not suitable to estimate the abnormal return for all repurchase days in the sample since the estimation windows will overlap the events. I therefore use the market adjusted model as benchmark which does not require any pre-event estimations. The market adjusted model is (8) where AR i,t is the abnormal return on security i over calendar day t, R i,t is the total return on security i over calendar day t, and R m,t is the total return on an equal-weighted index of all shares listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange over calendar day t.
31
Abnormal returns are indexed with the sequence number of the repurchase day in each repurchase program with the first repurchase day in each repurchase program j at τ=1. The average abnormal return over repurchase day τ, across all repurchase programs is (9) where AR j,τ is the abnormal return over repurchase day τ in repurchase program j, and N is the number of share repurchase programs. 31 We also use the return on the value-weighted OMXSPI as R m in the estimations and results. 
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The test statistic I use to evaluate the significance of the average abnormal return each repurchase day τ, is the ratio of the average abnormal return across repurchase programs, to its standard deviation (10) where σ(AR j,τ ) is the standard deviation of the abnormal returns on repurchase day τ across repurchase programs.
32 If the abnormal returns each repurchase day τ are independent and identically distributed, and normal, the test statistic is distributed Student-t under the null hypothesis. (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) .
34
In the RATS approach, security excess returns are regressed, each month in event time, on the three Fama-French (1993) factors and the additional momentum factor advocated by Carhart (1997) . The estimated intercept represents the monthly average abnormal return for each event month τ with the month of the initiation announcement indexed zero (τ=0). In the analysis I consider abnormal returns 6 months prior to the initiation announcement up to 24 months following the initiation announcement. 35 The following cross-sectional regressions are run each event month;
32 To control for the potential risk of variance changes in the returns surrounding the repurchase transactions I use a t-statistic based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of the abnormal returns instead of a t-statistic based on the times-series standard deviation of the abnormal returns. 33 Since the repurchase days are spread out within the repurchase programs and over the years I do not make any adjustments for cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal returns. Brown and Warner (1985) also argue that if the degree of dependence is small, ignoring the dependence induces little bias in the variance estimates. 34 I do not use the buy-and-hold methodology because the imperfect expected returns from bad-models are compounded with long horizons and since the methodology suffers from cross-sectional dependence of the individual firms' abnormal returns as argued by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) . 35 Returns are truncated June 2010 and the post-event period is truncated if the firm initiates a subsequent repurchase program. Observations in the six event months prior to the initiation announcement are excluded if they overlap with event months in a firm's prior repurchase program.
where R i,t is the monthly total return on security i in the calendar month t that corresponds to the event month τ, with τ=0 being the month of the share repurchase initiation announcement. R f,t is the return on the 30-day T-Bill and R m,t is the return on the value-weighted OMXSPI in calendar month t. HML t , SMB t and UMD t are the returns on the book-to-market, size, and momentum factor, respectively in calendar month t. The returns on the book-to-market and size factor are calculated as in Fama-French (1993) . 36 
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In the analysis I also consider momentum in returns as in Carhart (1997) . UMD is the difference between the equal-weighted average return of firms with the highest 30% 11-month returns minus the equal-weighted average of firms with the lowest 30% 11-month returns.
I also calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over different time-event windows and use the CAR divided by the square root of the sum of squares of the monthly standard errors over the event-time period as a t-statistic. The advantage of the RATS methodology is that it accounts for any changes in riskiness of the equity over the event-window and the drawback of the method is that the estimators are not minimum variance because the disturbances (ε i,t ) are heteroscedastic caused by the differing risk parameters and σ 2 (ε i,t ) that correspond to the different securities in the regression. To alleviate this issue I form portfolios using the calendar-time portfolio approach advocated by Fama (1998) , and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) .
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In the calendar-time portfolio approach portfolios of event firms are formed each calendar month. Firms that have initiated an open market share repurchase program are included in the portfolio the calendar month after the announcement month, and excluded from the portfolio after a 12 or 24 month holding period. At the beginning of each calendar month, the portfolio is rebalanced so that the portfolio is equally weighted. Excess returns are regressed on the three Fama-French (1993) factors as well as on the four Carhart (1997) factors as follows:
where R p,t is the monthly return on the equally weighted portfolio of event firms in calendar month t. The other variables are defined the same as above. By forming portfolios of event firms, any cross-sectional dependence of the individual event firm abnormal returns are accounted for in the portfolio variance at each point in calendar time. I also require at least 10 firms in the event portfolio each point in time to mitigate the heteroskedasticity problem from changing number of firms in the event portfolio through time.
Empirical results
The empirical results are separated into three parts. In the first part in section 6.1 I evaluate the price impact surrounding initiation announcements of share repurchase programs. In the second part, in section 6.2 I examine the price impact of the actual share repurchases using detailed data of repurchase transactions on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. In the third and last part, in section 6.3, I examine the long-run share price performance of firms that have initiated open market share repurchase programs. The calendar-time portfolio approach was originally used by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) . are preceded by a period of negative abnormal performance and that there is a significant positive price impact of the repurchase announcement with a possible overreaction. In the post event period the excess return appears to disappear. This result is similar to the findings reported by several prior studies examining repurchase announcements in other markets and time periods, e.g. Vermaelen (1981) , Comment and Jarrell (1991) , Ikenberry et al. (1995) , and Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004) .
Price impact of initiation announcements of open market share repurchase programs
In Table 3 the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) with t-statistics are reported for the different event windows around the share repurchase initiation announcement. For the full sample there is a significantly negative cumulative average abnormal return during the 20 trading days prior to the initiation announcement of -1.83% (t-statistic of -2.27) which suggests that the initiation announcement is triggered by a period of share price underperformance. The average two-day abnormal return around the initiation announcement is 1.94% (from day 0 to +1) and is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-statistic of 7.61). This is consistent with the three-day abnormal return of 2.39% reported by Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) for the US market over the period 1991 to 2001, and the two-day abnormal return of 2.15% reported by Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004) for the Japanese market over the period 1995 to 1998. In the period following the repurchase announcement (from day +2 to +20) the cumulative average abnormal return is not significantly different from zero (tstatistic of -0.67) for the whole sample.
In Table 3 I also split the sample by the fraction of outstanding shares that the firm intends to repurchase in the initiation announcement of the open market share repurchase program. 41 The average two-day abnormal return for firms that intend to repurchase less than 5% of the outstanding shares is 1.50%, and for firms that intend to repurchase 5% or more of the outstanding shares, the average two-day market reaction is 2.28%. This result is consistent with the findings by Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry et al. (1995) , who also find that larger repurchase programs are received more favorably by the market. In the post-40 I exclude 80 announcements because they were on the same day or the day after an interim report. I also exclude two announcements with other coincident confounding news and two announcements due to a short return history for estimating market model parameters. 41 Most firms state the maximum number of shares the firm intends to repurchase in the initiation announcement of the share repurchase program.
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announcement period (from day +2 to +20) the cumulative average abnormal return is -3.24%
and significantly negative for the smaller repurchase programs and not significantly different from zero for the larger programs. 1. Capital structure: The firm intends to repurchase shares to adjust the capital structure or distribute excess cash.
ESOP:
The repurchase is made in conjunction with an employee stock ownership plan.
Acquisitions:
The firm may use the repurchased shares in acquisitions.
Key ratios:
The repurchase is made to improve the firm's key ratios or off-set dilution.
Undervalued:
The share is a good investment. 
where CAR i is the two-day cumulative abnormal return over days 0 to 1 relative to repurchase announcement i. MCAP i is the natural log market capitalization and BM i is the book-tomarket equity value, of the firm with the repurchase announcement i, at the end of the prior year. SOUGHT i is the stated maximum fraction of the firm's total number of shares that the firm intends to repurchase or keep as treasury shares in repurchase announcement i. PRECAR i is the cumulative abnormal return from trading day -20 to trading day -1 relative to announcement i. ESOP i is a dummy variable coded one if at least one motivation for the repurchase program in the announcement i is that the repurchased shares are for an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), and zero otherwise. Table 5 shows the results from the regression where the standard errors of the coefficients have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity.
The coefficient for firm size (MCAP) is significantly negative which implies that the initial market reaction to the announcement of a share repurchase programs decreases with firm size.
If firm size is a proxy for informational asymmetry the result is consistent with the signaling hypothesis in which the repurchase announcement serves as a signal from the more informed managers that the firm is undervalued. If the informational asymmetry is higher for smaller firms, then the market reaction to repurchase announcements made by smaller firms should be more favorable than for larger firms.
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The book-to-market equity value (BM) is commonly used as a proxy for undervaluation.
Firms with relatively high book-to-market equity values are then considered undervalued and therefore more likely to have undervaluation as their primary motivation for share repurchases. I therefore expect to find a positive relationship between the initial market reaction to share repurchase announcements and the book-to-market equity value. However, in the regression, the coefficient for the book-to-market equity variable (BM) is not significantly different from zero. This result is consistent with the findings in Ikenberry et al. 42 Smaller firms are less followed by analysts and media and therefore subject to higher information asymmetries than larger firms.
(1995) that find no indication that the book-to-market ratio has any impact on the market reaction to repurchase announcements.
The stated fraction of the firm's total number of shares that the firm intends to repurchase in the initiation announcement (SOUGHT) does not explain the initial market reaction to the announcement of a share repurchase program. This is not surprising since 48% of the initiation announcements in the sample are for the maximum allowed repurchase size of 10% and therefore there is little variation in the SOUGHT variable to account for any variation in the abnormal return.
In the analysis of the cumulative average abnormal return around the initiation announcement of share repurchase programs ( Table 3 ) I found that the cumulative average abnormal return was significantly negative in the pre-announcement period (trading day -20 to -1 relative to the announcement). To control for any mean-reversion effect arising from the negative abnormal return in the pre-announcement period I include a variable for the cumulative abnormal return over days -20 to -1 relative to the announcement (PRECAR). The coefficient for the PRECAR variable is significantly negative which implies that there is a negative relationship between the market reaction to the repurchase announcement and the pre-announcement cumulative abnormal return. 43 Kahle (2002) argues that if companies repurchase shares to fund employee stock option exercises, then in an efficient market, the repurchase announcement return should not be as positive as if the repurchases were due to undervaluation (the option-funding hypothesis). In the regression I therefore include a dummy variable coded one if any of the stated reasons in the initiation announcement of the share repurchase program is for an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). The coefficient for the ESOP variable in the regression is significantly negative and therefore consistent with Kahle's (2002) option-funding hypothesis.
Price impact of actual share repurchases
In this section I analyze the short-term price effect of actual share repurchases in open market share repurchase programs. If repurchasing firms have market timing ability and repurchase shares when the shares are temporarily undervalued, then other traders will find it valuable to identify repurchase trades. I should therefore observe a permanent positive price impact on repurchase days when other market participants detect that a company repurchases shares. 44 Alternatively, the submission of buy limit orders by repurchasing firms may result in a temporary price impact. The pre-event excess return seems stable which indicates that firms on average do not time the beginning of their repurchase trades to a period of prior underperformance. On the first repurchase day and the following three days there is a strong positive price impact. After a reversal in the abnormal returns later in the post-event period, the prices seem to stabilize on a higher level than in the pre-event period. These results are consistent with a signaling hypothesis of undervaluation, but also with a hypothesis of a liquidity driven price impact since there is a small degree of reversal in the post-event period.
In Table 6 repurchase programs that I found in section 6.1. 44 Firms that repurchase shares on the Stockholm Stock Exchange must publicly disclose their repurchase transactions as soon as possible and not later than 30 minutes before the opening of the stock exchange the following trading day. Repurchase volumes each repurchase day are also often quite substantial. Market participants are therefore able to identify repurchase trades with ease. 45 From the initial sample I exclude repurchase programs in which the first repurchase transaction in the program is on the same day or the day after an interim report. I also exclude five repurchase programs with too short a history to estimate the parameters in the market model.
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When I split the sample by the stated motivation of the share repurchase program I find that the price impact on the first repurchase day is positive for all programs whatever the stated motivation for the program in the initiation announcement. However, the abnormal return is only significantly positive for repurchase programs that are motivated by capital structure adjustments or excess cash distributions. For these programs the two-day abnormal return over day 0 to +1 is on average 0.89% with a t-statistic of 4.07.
If the first repurchase trade in a repurchase program is a valuable signal of undervaluation I would expect subsequent repurchase days in repurchase programs to have less signaling value. In Table 7 I report the average abnormal return for each of the first ten repurchase days in each repurchase program. I also report the average abnormal return for all repurchase days in the sample. I use the market adjusted model to estimate the abnormal return and use the equal-or value-weighted market return as benchmark.
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The average abnormal return for all repurchase days in the sample is 0.12% with the equal-weighed market return index as benchmark. Worthwhile noting is that repurchasing firms almost repurchase one third (31.8%) of the total traded volume each repurchase day.
The persistent submission of buy limit orders from the repurchasing firms would likely support the share price temporarily. Table 7 also shows that the first repurchase day in a repurchase program has the greatest price impact which indicates as predicted that the first repurchase in a repurchase program has the most valuable signal. The average repurchase fraction is however relatively higher (42.0%) on the first repurchase day than on the other reported repurchase days, thus the larger price impact on the first repurchase day may be due to a liquidity effect.
To analyze the abnormal returns on the actual repurchase days more in detail I run the following firm fixed effects regression (16) where AR i,j is the abnormal return for firm i on repurchase day j. The abnormal return is calculated using the market adjusted model with the equal-weighted return of all shares on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and the value-weighted OMXSPI, as benchmarks respectively. REPFRAC i,j is the fraction of the total number of traded shares that firm i repurchase on day j.
FIRST i,j is a dummy variable coded one if the repurchase day j is the first repurchase day in 46 I have five more "first repurchase day" observations in Table 7 than I have in Table 6 since five observations are dropped in Table 6 due to a too short return history for calculating market model normal returns. The market adjusted model used in Table 6 to calculate normal returns do not require any historical returns.
the repurchase program initiated by firm i, zero otherwise. TENDAYS i is a dummy variable coded one if there are 10 or more trading days between the repurchase day j and the prior repurchase day in the repurchase program initiated by firm i.
In Table 8 I report the results from the firm fixed effects regression. The coefficient for the repurchase size variable REPFRAC is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level which indicates a positive correlation between the repurchase fraction and the abnormal return. As I noted earlier in the univariate analysis I found that the first repurchase in a repurchase program on average is greeted with the largest abnormal return. I therefore include a dummy variable FIRST coded one if the repurchase event is the first in a repurchase program. The coefficient for the FIRST variable is positive and highly significant even after I control for the repurchase fraction. Finally I also test if the price impact is higher for the first repurchase event after a period of at least 10 non-repurchasing days in a repurchase program by including the dummy variable TENDAYS. However, even if the coefficient is positive it is not statistically different from zero at any conventional levels. 47 During the second year following the initiation announcement the abnormal performance seems to subside.
Long-run share price performance of repurchasing firms
In Table 9 I report the abnormal returns for each month during the first year following the initiation announcement and the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) for six time periods. 48 The abnormal returns each event month are calculated using Ibbotson's (1975) returns across time and securities (RATS) methodology. I report the abnormal returns applying both the Fama-French (1993) (2000) and Yook (2010) . In the month of the initiation announcement (event month 0) the average abnormal return is approximately 2.1% and statistically significant at the 1% level. The average abnormal return in the month of the initiation announcement of a repurchase program is thus similar to the two-day abnormal return of 1.94% around the initiation announcement found in section 6.1. In the first year following the initiation announcement (event months +1, +12) the cumulative average abnormal return is approximately 7% and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is similar to the 12 month cumulative abnormal return of 7.27% found by Ikenberry et al. (2000) in a sample of 1,060 Canadian repurchase programs between 1989 and 1997, but higher than the first year cumulative abnormal return of 2.67% found by Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) in the US market over the period 1991-2001. 49 Interestingly, when I partition the first year into a first and second half, I find that the major part of the abnormal performance is concentrated during months 7 to 12 following the initiation announcement. In the same time period the fraction of firms that actually repurchase shares declines. This pattern is consistent with the market timing hypothesis which suggests that managers repurchase shares in response to undervaluation. The results are also similar to Ikenberry et al. (2000) who find that abnormal performance decreases in periods where firms were active buyers. However, in contrast to Ikenberry et al. (1995 Ikenberry et al. ( , 2000 , and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) I find no further abnormal return following the first year after the initiation announcement.
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To eliminate any possible dependence between observations within calendar months, Ibbotson (1975) selected at random one event per calendar month. As a robustness check I also follow this procedure and randomly select only one observation per calendar month. The results are omitted for the sake of brevity, but are qualitatively similar to the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) reported in Table 9 .
As an alternative to Ibbotson's (1975) RATS methodology, to estimate long-run abnormal performance, I also apply a calendar-time portfolio approach advocated by Fama (1998) , and 49 Ikenberry et al. (2000) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) found these results using Ibbotson's (1975) RATS methodology and applying the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. 50 Since I do not permit event months following repurchase programs to overlap with event months in subsequent repurchase programs the number of observations in the event months following the initiation announcement decreases. Due to the relatively small sample I therefore only examine the abnormal performance up to 24 months following the initiation announcement.
28 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) . The results of the calendar-time portfolio approach are reported in Table 10 the three-factor Fama-French (1993) model, and the four-factor Carhart (1997) model. Table   10 reports results of the regression of equally-weighted repurchase portfolio returns for three holding periods; event months 1-12, event months 1-24, and event months 13-24, relative to the initiation announcement month (month 0).
The monthly average abnormal return for the one year holding period following the initiation announcement is 0.53% (t-statistic of 2.19) with the Fama-French (1993) model specification, and 0.52% (t-statistic of 2.27) with the four-factor Carhart (1997) model specification. These results translate to an annual abnormal return of approximately 6% that match the first year cumulative average abnormal return of 7% obtained using Ibbotson's (1975) RATS methodology in Table 9 . For holding periods up to two years following the initiation announcement the monthly average abnormal return decreases to 0.41% (t-statistic 
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announcement and the 12 months following the announcement. 52 In the 6-month time period prior to the initiation announcement there is no significant abnormal return for programs with a repurchased fraction of more than 2% of the total number of shares. However, programs with a repurchased fraction of less than 2% of the total number of shares are preceded with an average monthly abnormal return of 1.01% (t-statistic of 1.91). One explanation for these results could be that firms are willing to repurchase large amounts of shares only if the stock has not overperformed in the months preceding the initiation announcement, and that the reason for many of the smaller repurchase programs is to provide shares for incentive plans which is more likely if the stock has had a good performance over the months preceding the repurchase program.
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Focusing on abnormal returns over the 12 months following the initiation announcement, there is also a difference between the two groups. For repurchase programs with a repurchased fraction less than 2% of the total number of shares, the abnormal return performance is not significantly different from zero, whereas for repurchase programs with a repurchased fraction of more than 2% of the total number of shares, the average monthly return is 0.75% and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-statistic of 2.42). This average monthly abnormal return corresponds to an abnormal return of 9% on an annual basis.
Overall the results from the long-run performance analysis indicate that long-run abnormal return is positively associated with the fraction of shares bought in the program.
Conclusions
Share repurchases are a relatively new phenomenon in Europe and little is still known about the effects open market share repurchases have on the firms' stock price in a European regulatory setting that differs to a large extent from the regulatory environment in e.g. the US.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the stock price behavior surrounding the initiation announcements of the repurchase programs, the price impact of the repurchase trading, and Open market share repurchases in Sweden are interesting to study since the repurchase transactions are disclosed on a daily basis. Market participants are therefore able to instantly trade on any perceived asymmetric information they find valuable from the repurchase transactions. The repurchasing firms' repurchase volumes on the repurchase days are also quite substantial relative to the total trading volume in the stock that may lead to a price support of the firms' shares.
The results show that initiation announcements of open market share repurchase programs by the board of directors, are associated with a two-day abnormal return of 1.94%, similar to the announcement effect found in prior US studies (e.g. Comment and Jarell, 1991; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Grullon and Michaely, 2004; and Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005) . The positive abnormal return indicates that initiation announcements of open market share repurchase are perceived by the market participants as signal of undervaluation. Interestingly, the announcement effect is lower for repurchase programs motivated by stock option plans, which is consistent with the hypothesis that programs motivated by stock option plans are not driven by perceived undervaluation of the firms'
shares.
The price impact on the actual repurchase days is positively correlated with the daily repurchase volume and is both statistically and economically significant during the first 3 repurchase days in a repurchase program. These results indicate that repurchase trading provides price support and that the market detects and perceives the first repurchase days in a repurchase program as a signal of undervaluation.
Finally, using Ibbotson's (1975) RATS methodology and the calendar-time portfolio approach I find a positive 12 month abnormal stock performance of 6-7% subsequent to the initiation announcement that is positively associated with the fraction of shares bought in the program. The table shows summary statistics of open market share repurchase programs by Swedish firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, in which at least one share has been repurchased. The year of the repurchase program is the year the program was authorized by the shareholders at a shareholders' meeting. The authorized fraction is the fraction of the total number of shares in the company that the shareholders authorized the company to repurchase or keep as treasury shares The sought fraction is the maximum fraction of the total number of shares in the company that the board of directors intended to repurchase or keep as treasury shares in the initiation announcement of the share repurchase program. The initiation announcement is the announcement by the board of directors to utilize the repurchase authorization. Bought fraction is the fraction of the total number of shares in the company that was actually repurchased in the repurchase program. Due to missing data the sought fraction is based on a total of 209 initiation announcements. Fraction numbers in the table are in percent. The table also shows statistics of the number of trading days between the repurchase authorization and the initiation announcement, the trading days between the repurchase authorization and the first repurchase day, and the trading days between the initiation announcement and the first repurchase day in the repurchase program. The initiation announcement is the announcement by the board of directors to utilize the repurchase authorization. Due to missing data the sought fraction is based on a total of 210 initiation announcements. 
where CAR i is the two-day cumulative abnormal return over days 0 to 1 relative to announcement i. MCAP i is the natural log market capitalization and BM i is the book-to-market equity value, of the firm with the initiation announcement i, at the end of the prior year. SOUGHT i is the stated maximum fraction of the firm's total number of shares that the firm intends to repurchase or keep as treasury shares in initiation announcement i. PRECAR i is the cumulative abnormal return from trading day -20 to trading day -1 relative to the initiation announcement i. ESOP i is a dummy variable coded one if at least one motivation for the repurchase program in the initiation announcement i is that the repurchased shares are for an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), and zero otherwise. The standard errors of the coefficients have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity using White's (1980) procedure. *, ** and *** indicate two-tailed significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
where AR i,j is the abnormal return for firm i on repurchase day j. The abnormal return is calculated using the market adjusted model with the equal-weighted return of all shares on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (EW benchmark) and the value-weighted OMXSPI (VW benchmark), as benchmarks respectively. REPFRAC i,j is the fraction of the total number of traded shares that firm i repurchase on day j. FIRST i,j is a dummy variable coded one if the repurchase day j is the first repurchase day in the repurchase program initiated by firm i, zero otherwise. TENDAYS i is a dummy variable coded one if there are 10 or more trading days between the repurchase day j and the prior repurchase day in the repurchase program initiated by firm i. The sample includes repurchase days over the period March 2000 through April 2009 in 311 repurchase programs initiated by 120 firms. Repurchase events the same day or the day after an interim report are excluded from the sample as well as repurchase events September 11-12, 2001 . Estimation is done with firm fixed effects and standard errors adjusted for group-wise heteroscedasticity. *, ** and *** indicate two-tailed significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
39
The figure plots the monthly cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) 6 months prior to and up to 24 months following initiation announcements of open market share repurchase programs over the period March 2000 through March 2010. Abnormal returns are calculated each event month using Ibbotson's (1975) returns across time and securities (RATS) methodology and applying the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
